University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
OSSA Conference Archive

OSSA 10

May 22nd, 9:00 AM - May 25th, 5:00 PM

Is critical thinking across the curriculum a plausible goal?
Donald L. Hatcher
Baker University, Department of Philosophy

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Hatcher, Donald L., "Is critical thinking across the curriculum a plausible goal?" (2013). OSSA Conference
Archive. 69.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA10/papersandcommentaries/69

This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Is critical thinking across the curriculum a plausible goal?
DONALD L. HATCHER
Philosophy
Baker University
Baldwin City, KS
USA
dhatcher@bakeru.edu

ABSTRACT: Critical thinking (CT) is considered an essential educational goal. As a result, many
philosophers dreamed their departments would offer multiple sections of CT, hence justifying hiring
additional staff. Unfortunately, this dream did not materialize. So, similar to a current theory about
teaching writing, “critical thinking across the curriculum” has become a popular idea. While the idea
has appeal and unquestionable merit, I will argue that the likelihood the skills necessary for effective
CT will actually be taught is minimal.
KEYWORDS: critical thinking, critical thinking across the curriculum, critical thinking skills,
deductive reconstruction, informal logic

1. INTRODUCTION
Hardly anyone in academe denies the importance of students learning to think
critically. Scholar after scholar has proclaimed its importance. For example, wellknown textbook author Diane Halpern (1993, p. 238) claimed that “The ability to
think critically is almost always listed as one of the desirable outcomes of higher
education.” Williams, Oliver, and Stockdale (2004, p. 34) have claimed that “few
concepts have attracted more attention than critical thinking.” According to one
survey, 90% of professors claimed critical thinking (CT) was “the most important
purpose of undergraduate education” (Bok, 2006, pp. 67-68 ). Arum and Roksa
(2011, p. 35) report that “99% of college faculty say that developing students’ ability
to think critically is ‘very important’ or essential.’” R. J. Aldisert (1997, p. xxii), a
practicing U.S. Circuit Court judge and textbook author, claimed that skills normally
associated with CT should be a part of the education of all law students.1 Finally, a
recent survey in Forbes claimed that CT was the number one skill desired by wouldbe employers in 2013 (Casserly, 2012).
In his book Logic for Lawyers, Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert writes “One has only to read a sampling of
appellate briefs directed to the United States Court of Appeals …to perceive the necessity of
improving logical presentations….All lawyers must understand basic concepts of deductive
reasoning….(and) inductive reasoning, with its twin facets of induced generalization and analogy.
And they should have a mental blueprint of how to recognize formal and material fallacies. This is
what members of the legal profession need (xxii). This could be a description of what is covered in
many critical thinking texts.
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With such interest across the disciplines and among the professions, it was
natural for some of us in philosophy to dream that our departments would be asked
to develop and teach numerous sections of CT courses, and that would, much like
written composition requirements did for English Departments, justify hiring
significant numbers of new professors to teach the sections of the required CT
courses. For many reasons, not the least of which was the added expense of hiring a
cadre of philosophically trained CT teachers, this dream did not materialize. So,
much like those in charge of teaching written composition who also found
themselves lacking faculty resources have endorsed the idea of “writing across the
curriculum,” the idea of “critical thinking across the curriculum” (CTAC) was
introduced. This has been deemed a positive move by such CT reformers as Richard
Paul (2011) and Gerald Nosich (2009; 2012). Rather than CT skills being taught
primarily in courses offered by philosophy departments, instruction would be
integrated into courses in almost every discipline. Indeed, sounding almost as
convincing as the phrase “No Child Left Behind,” who could claim the “Critical
Thinking Across the Curriculum” was not a worthy educational goal?
Part of the appeal of CTAC is that a college curriculum that had a successful
CTAC program would avoid the all-too-common situation Sharon Bailin described in
one of her papers, “The Problem with Percy: Epistemology, Understanding, and
Critical Thinking” (1999). There she describes a student who has done poorly on a
paper because the very idea of providing good arguments and evidence (let alone
evaluating the alternative positions) was something that he believed only happened
in CT or philosophy courses, not across the curriculum. If CTAC were ever to become
a reality, students would expect those sorts of assignments in almost every class and
be prepared to handle them well. In theory anyway, it would seem that one course
taught by a philosopher trained in CT could not be nearly as effective as students
getting the central CT concepts and skills in many of their classes across the
disciplines and throughout their college careers.
In spite of the appeal and nearly universal commitment to the value of
enhancing students’ CT skills, numerous studies reporting students’ gains in CT
skills indicate that a college education has been only marginally successful, to put it
generously, in teaching the needed skills (Arum & Roksa, 2011; Bok, 2006; Hatcher,
2011; Pascarella & Terenzini, 2005). Arum and Roksa (2011, p. 35) report, using the
College Learning Assessment (CLA) test, that students gained only 0.18 of a
standard deviation in their first two years of college.2 In their influential How College
Affects Students, Vol.2, Pascarella and Terenzini surveyed a wide variety of
assessment reports, using a variety of standardized assessment instruments, with
most of their data coming from the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (CCTST).
The gains in a percentage of a standard deviation or what is now called “effect size”
It should be noted that the CLA test is not without its critics. Kevin Possin’s paper “A Serious Flaw in
the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA) Test,” argues that the standards for grading the students’
essays are not the standards that most who understand logic would apply. “I was struck by how any
answer was accepted so long as the writer offered reasons for it, no matter its justificatory power or
lack thereof…” (p. 8).
2
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from freshman to senior year were estimated at 0.55 to 0.65, with freshman to
sophomore gains of only 0.34 (2005, p. 157). My own assessment data from
eighteen years of using either the Ennis–Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test (E-W),
The California Critical Thinking Skills Test (CCTST), and the Cornel Level Z Critical
Thinking Test (CLZ) showed a variety of effect size gains ranging from 0.97 to 0.57,
depending on the test used (Hatcher, 2011; 2009; 2006). While these gains are
better than some of the reported data, one can hardly say they indicate a highly
successful approach to teaching CT. For example, for the students at Baker
University, a 0.57 effect size gain on the CLZ means that after a year-long course
integrating CT and written composition, the average student gained only 2.7 points
on a 52-question test.
So, given the evidence, I think it is fair to conclude that current approaches to
teaching CT are not working very well, and, while in theory CTAC sounds like a
terrific idea, I believe the likelihood that professors from across the disciplines will
actually teach the knowledge and skills necessary for effective CT is small. Such a
conclusion is not an easy one for me, and I actually hope people who read this will
show where I am wrong. There is nothing I would like more than for CTAC to work.
However, based on the reports of CT assessment, my own research, and many years
working with Baker University’s program, I am afraid the conclusion is warranted.
One problem, I believe, is the logical skills necessary for effective CT, however we
define it, are not part of the education of professors in many disciplines, nor are all
professors equally enamored with the high value critical thinking places on
rationality (Hatcher, 1991). It should be no surprise then that many are not
particularly effective at teaching the needed skills. This should be no more
surprising than someone pointing out that not everyone with a PhD can teach
mathematics, piano, or basketball. Secondly, from a practical standpoint there is
considerable evidence, mostly taken from the data from the Critical Thinking and
Composition Program at Baker University (1990 -2008), that even well-intending
professors who sincerely desire to teach CT skills and who are given extensive
training cannot effectively teach them.
Notice that there is nothing logically contradictory or incoherent about the
concept of CTAC or having it as an educational ideal. The problems that prevent this
worthy goal from being realized to any significant extent, I shall argue, all have to do
with teachers, their academic values, their own educations, and the realities of
higher education.
2. WHAT EXACTLY IS THE GOAL?
If CTAC were to materialize, what would it look like? While this may seem like an
obvious place to start, some might claim that to answer the question of what CTAC
would look like first requires we agree on some conception of CT, and, more
importantly, the skills needed to engage in this special sort of cognitive activity
(Hatcher, 2011). It seems obvious that not all thinking is “critical” thinking.
Recounting an important historical event is thinking, but not critical thinking.
Summarizing a plot structure for a piece of fiction is thinking, but not “critical”
thinking. Reporting on the current state of research on Alzheimer’s is thinking, but
3
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not critical thinking. So, what makes some thinking, “critical thinking”?
It would be convenient if we could just go to some dictionary or encyclopedia
and find a standard definition of CT and a list of its corresponding skills. However,
as is obvious to anyone who has followed the literature on CT, that will not happen.
As Matt Lipman’s (2006, pp. 56 -58) research has shown, there are at least thirtyone definitions of CT in the literature. How do we decide which is the correct one?
Unlike the concerns of Sanders and Moulenbeit (2011, p. 39), who claim that
“The need for consensus is evident if collaboration across the disciplines is to
involve the development of critical thinking skills,” I believe that agreeing on what
counts as the best definition is not necessary. Look, for example, at how California
handled their CT requirement. In 1981, California Law (EO 338) required all
California graduates of state institutions (over 1/3 million students) to have nine
hours in oral and written communication and critical thinking. Currently, Executive
Order (EO1065) maintains the same requirement and, without defining CT, while
stating clearly what sorts of knowledge and skills are required to satisfy the
requirement:
In critical thinking courses, students will understand logic and its relation to
language; elementary inductive and deductive processes, including an
understanding of the formal and informal fallacies of language and thought; and the
ability to distinguish matters of fact from issues of judgment or opinion....students
will develop the abilities to analyze, criticize, and advocate ideas; to reason
inductively and deductively; and to reach well-supported factual or judgmental
conclusions (p. 7).

If one looks at the most common definitions in the literature, each implies a
specific set of fundamental skills and the exercise of these skills in appropriate
situations, e.g., Bob Ennis’s (1987, pp. 1-5) critical thinking is “reasonable reflective
thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe and do” or Pete Facione’s (1986,
p. 222) “Critical thinking is the ability of a person to present well-reasoned
arguments and to evaluate correctly the arguments others present.” The primacy of
skills over any definition is also evident if one looks at some of the more common
standardized critical thinking tests, e.g. the Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test
(Ennis, R. & Weir, E., 1985), the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione, P &
Facione, N. C, 1994), or the Cornell Critical Thinking Test, Level Z (Ennis, R, Millman,
J., & Tomko, T, 2004). These tests are not testing whether students or teachers are
using or understand some specific definition of CT. They are testing whether
students understand and can apply a specific set of logical skills, e.g. identify and
evaluate deductive and inductive reasoning, being sensitive to informal fallacies,
being sensitive to definitions. Pascarella and Terenzini (2005, p. 156) make the
same point, that is, while definitions vary, most attempts focus on the individual’s
ability perform certain intellectual skills successfully. Fisher and Scriven (1997,
p.87) make a similar point: “…anyone who wishes to develop as a critical thinker
will have to polish various constituent skills…”
So what are these? If one looks at the test booklets or the literature by some
of the better-known writers on CT, the list could be quite long (Ennis, 2011, 1987;
Facione, P & Facione, N., 1994). However, at a minimum, I believe that any
4
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conception of CT must include at least three basic skills. At a most basic level, they
are 1) students must be able to analyze, clarify, and understand what is being
claimed and the support that is provided, 2) after skill #1, students must then be
able to evaluate the reasonableness of the position; in other words they must be
able to evaluate an argument, and 3) students must have the ability to articulate
their reasoned judgments in writing (Hatcher and Spencer, 2006, pp. 32-39); that is,
once they have evaluated an argument, they must be able to articulate their
judgment and defend it with evidence and arguments. I believe this defense should
include stating clearly and honestly evaluating any objections to their chosen
positions. This later skill is especially important. As J.S. Mill (1978, p. 35) said in On
Liberty, “He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that. His
reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute him. But if he is
equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side, if he does not so much
know what they are, he has no grounds for preferring either opinion.” It is what
Ralph Johnson (2000, pp. 164-175) has called the dialectical tier of argumentation.
The importance of this dialectical skill is not reserved only for philosophers. It also
emphasized in The Bedford Handbook (Hacker & Sommers, pp. 111-114), a book on
style and mechanics widely required by writing instructors. So, the dialectical
nature of CT is not something that only philosophers (and lawyers) emphasize. 3
So, rather than arguing about what counts as the best definition of CT, if one
wants to see whether CT is being taught in a course or across a curriculum, I believe
the best strategy is to see that specific academic skills are implied in any definition,
as well as the focus in most of the widely-used standard CT tests, and then look for
them in a school’s curriculum.4 If CT is being at least minimally taught in a course,
then all three skills are either being taught or applied. If they are absent, then CT is
not being taught.
One need not expect that these three basic CT skills will be taught in every
course. That would result in redundancy (R. H. Ennis, personal communication, July
2, 2012). However, these skills do need to be taught somewhere, and because they
are so essential for student success at CT, preferably early in the students’ academic
experience. In my opinion, the best option would be to focus on them in some
designated entry–level course or courses, hopefully taught persons with adequate
training in and passion for CT. After that, at least ideally, students would be required
In his book, Clueless in Academe, Gerald Graff argues that these skills should be the focus of all
college education. This is what academic writing is all about. Of course, as the title of his book
indicates, not many professors teach these three fundamental skills. See also Chapter Two, of Hatcher
and Spencer’s, Reasoning and Writing: From Critical Thinking to Composition (2006).
3

Some may note that I have changed my position, given that I once argued (2000) for a new
definition of CT, i.e., “the honest evaluation of alternatives with respect to available evidence and
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Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT), I thought that agreeing on a definition was very
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to take a number of courses in a variety of disciplines designated “CT” courses
because they included specific assignments that required students to exercise these
three skills. Given the redundancy problem, this approach seems to make the most
sense. However, I shall argue that this ideal is unlikely to ever be realized. It is a
noble but implausible goal.
Let’s take a closer look at these skills.
3. ARGUMENT #1: WHERE IN A CURRICULM DO WE FIND CT SKILLS?
3.1. Skill #1: Understanding arguments
For any issue or question, when trying to decide what to accept or reject, one
must be able to understand the various positions or alternatives and the support
given for each alternative. For example, imagine that someone wanted to decide
whether it was reasonable to believe in a theistic God, as commonly conceived. The
person would first need to find and understand the various arguments given in
support of the rationality of such religious belief. Next, the person would need to
find and understand the arguments given in opposition to the rationality of such a
belief. Unless one has access to a number of anthologies that contain many of these
arguments, this will also require having some research skills or what is now called
“information literacy.” To state the obvious: One must be able to find the alternative
positions prior to analyzing and evaluating them.
An exercise to demonstrate whether a student has understood an argument
in a piece of writing is if he or she can summarize it by stating the position and the
reasons given in its support. Suppose someone was assigned a basic summary of
Bertrand Russell’s “Why I Am Not a Christian.” At a basic level, the summary would
look something like this: “According to Bertrand Russell, it is irrational to believe in
the theistic god (position) because the standard arguments for its existence are all
flawed and the character of Jesus is questionable (reasons). For the beginning
student, this can be a challenging task. For complex pieces of argumentation,
paraphrasing prior to summarizing is a good idea.
In general then, whatever specific knowledge and skills are needed to
understand the various positions and their support are necessary conditions for
rationally deciding whether to accept or reject the position. As a necessary
condition, it follows that courses that do not teach or ask students how to get clear
on the arguments, stating the conclusion and its putative support, that are in their
readings are not courses that include critical thinking. For example, if a course in
history simply asks students to research a particular event and write a research
paper, such a course does not include CT. If a science course simply asks students to
explain what Kuhn meant by “normal science” rather than introducing them to the
various debates in the discipline, it does not include CT. If a literature course merely
asks students to trace the plot structure of or follow the use of some symbol in some
piece of fiction, that is not critical thinking.
For our purposes, the main question is how many courses across the
curriculum ask students to summarize the arguments in a piece they are studying? I
am skeptical. In fact, there may be disciplines where the materials students study do
6
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not contain any arguments. For example, I can imagine an American History
textbook that tells a narrative without any argument.
3.2 Skill #2: Evaluating Arguments
The next skill is argument evaluation. One must ask how widely argument
evaluation skills are taught in a college curriculum. Because all positions and their
support cannot be equally strong, students who would be effective critical thinkers
must also learn to evaluate fairly the arguments for alternative positions. To
evaluate an argument fairly means to apply consistently a specific set of epistemic
or logical standards to each position and its support. Because there is no one
standard way to evaluate arguments, I will not attempt to defend any one approach
over alternatives. The main point is the ability to evaluate the reasonableness of a
position is necessary for effective CT. Such evaluation, however conceived, requires
a good deal of expertise and practice.
One approach to argument evaluation is “the fallacy approach” (Damer,
2001; Johnson & Blair, 1994). This approach tends to teach the standard informal
fallacies and use that knowledge to evaluate arguments. Arguments are
unacceptable if some informal fallacy is committed. However, this alone is not
enough to determine if an argument is a good one or not. In addition to not
committing a fallacy, the premises in support of any conclusion must be relevant,
acceptable and sufficient (Johnson & Blair, 1994, pp. 54-55). Finally, any acceptable
piece of argumentation must provide an effective rebuttal to all serious counterarguments (Damer, 2001, pp. 23-41). Again, this is what Ralph Johnson (2000, pp.
164-175) has called the dialectical tier of argumentation. Given these conditions,
students must spend a good deal of time learning exactly what makes for premises
that are relevant, acceptable, and sufficient, as well as studying the common
informal fallacies—a list that can be quite long. Often, this alone can take an entire
semester.
Another possible approach to argument evaluation is “Deductive
Reconstruction” (Cederblom & Paulsen, 2006; Hatcher, 1999a, 1999b; Hatcher &
Spencer, 2006). Deductive Reconstruction is an approach to evaluating arguments
that asks students first to summarize the arguments found in readings, stating the
arguments’ conclusions and any putative support. The ideal summary would look
something like, ”According to Smith, marijuana should be legalized because of
reasons a, b, and c. Once the argument is summarized, an additional If/then premise
is added to make the argument a valid deductive argument. The pattern is often
Modus Ponens or Modus Tollens or some combination of valid argument patterns. For
example, the summary of the argument for the legalization of marijuana would be
transformed into a valid deductive argument by adding the major premise, “If some
drug has properties a, b, and c, then it should be legal.” The minor premise is
“Marijuana has properties a, b, and c.” Hence, the conclusion is “So, Marijuana
should be legalized.” A summary of Bertrand Russell’s position in “Why I am not a
Christian,” might be “It is irrational to be a Christian (position) because the
arguments for the existence of god are weak and the portrayal of Jesus in scripture
shows that he was neither wise nor good (reasons).” In order to make the argument
7
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valid, a second premise is added in the form of a conditional, “If all of the arguments
for the existence of god are weak and the portrayal of Jesus in scripture shows that
he was neither wise nor good, then it is irrational to be a Christian.” The form of the
argument is now Modus Ponens.
In the Deductive Reconstruction model, evaluating the support for a premise
requires adequate knowledge of inductive reasoning. Determining the
reasonableness of an “If/then” premise often requires extensive research into the
background and history of the debate. So, in this model, there is no way to evaluate
the claims without becoming familiar with the context that frames the issue, as well
as the nature of inductive inferences and their limitations. Finally, if critical inquiry
is construed as “honest inquiry,” inquirers must construct and evaluate the
arguments on all sides of an issue before making a judgment as to which position is
most reasonable. In this way, one fulfills one’s dialectical obligations.
It should be noted that in some cases of practical reasoning, the
reconstructed arguments have premises with such qualifiers as usually, likely,
probably, or all things being equal (Cederblom, 2012; Ennis, 2004). If the concept of
validity is applied strictly, these arguments are problematic because it is possible for
the premises to be true but the conclusion false. For example, consider the
argument: If a student has a long history of academic success in high school, it is
likely that the student will do well in college. Smith has a long history of academic
success in high school. Hence, it is likely that Smith will do well in college.” While
this appears to be Modus Ponens and so a deductively valid. argument, we all know
that there are many instances where the Smiths of the academic world do not do
well in college. This particular Smith may not know how to behave or manage his or
her time once he or she leaves home and flunk out. However, even if such arguments
do not meet all of the requirements of valid deductive arguments, i.e., that it is
impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false, I have argued
(2003) that, because of its simplicity, Deductive Reconstruction is a useful tool for
helping students get clear on just what the reasons are intended to support a
position and focus on their adequacy.
While there are other methodologies for evaluating arguments, e.g., the
Toulmin Method (1958), or Hitchcock’s (2003) or van Gelder’s (2004) computerassisted argument mapping, the point should be adequately clear that these
evaluation techniques are not the sort of things that one learns or exercises in
classes across the curriculum. For example, in my own education as an
undergraduate English major, I had nineteen courses in literature, and there was
never a word about recognizing or evaluating arguments. Given what Kuhn said
about the teaching of “normal science” (Kuhn, 1962, pp. 35-42), one can imagine
science majors having much the same experience as I did in English.
3.3 Skill #3: Articulating one’s judgment
The third skill that is necessary for successful CT is the ability to articulate one’s
judgment, stating one’s position and its support, in clear convincing prose. Properly
done, this demonstrates that one has gone through steps one and two in a proper
fashion. That is, one has clearly understood some position and its support and was
8
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able to evaluate it by the common logical standards of either Deductive
Reconstruction or a more informal approach. A proper articulation would also show
that one has given serious attention to alternative positions or critiques of one’s
own position. So, the form of the articulation will be a paper that explains the
position to be critiqued, then critiques the position, honestly entertains objections
and gives adequate responses, and then draws a conclusion.
This sort of paper is not uncommon, and could in theory be part of almost all
college courses. However, in my experience, it is not the norm.
4. ARGUMENT #2: UNDER IDEAL CONDITIONS CAN TEACHERS ACROSS THE
DISCIPLINES EFFECTIVELY TEACH THE ESSENTIAL CT SKILLS?
A second reason that CTAC is an implausible goal is there is evidence that, even
under more or less ideal conditions, faculty from across the disciplines cannot
effectively teach the basic skills necessary for CT. The support for this claim is from
eighteen years of assessment data from Baker University’s General Education
Program. The core components of the program consisted of three specially-designed
courses required of all students: a two-semester freshman sequence and a senior
capstone seminar. The freshman sequence, "Critical Thinking and Effective Writing"
and "Ideas and Exposition," provided instruction for freshmen in the fundamental
skills needed for critical thinking and then showed how these skills can be
successfully applied in writing position papers. The senior capstone seminar,
"Science, Technology, and Human Values," asked seniors to choose a public policy
issue brought about by current scientific or technological developments and then
research, prepare, present, and defend a fifteen to twenty page position paper
arguing for a specific public policy. Topics included cloning research, water use
policy, energy policy, reproductive technologies, numerous medical issues, and
defense policy, to name a few of approximately 150 on a list. In the spirit of Mill’s On
Liberty, a significant part of the paper required a clear presentation of and response
to possible objections to the proposed policy.
The capstone began in1979, and it was not long before those teaching in the
program realized that many seniors were seriously challenged (to put it mildly)
when asked to write such a paper. The primary difficulty was that students did not
understand how to construct or evaluate arguments. In 1984, with the help of a
grant from the Council of Independent Colleges, we invited Gerald Nosich to do a
week-long workshop on CTAC. While Nosich did a very good job,5 upon examining
the syllabi of courses taught by those who attended, it was clear that nothing had
really changed. In 1987, with the help of a grant from the Council of Philosophical
Studies we brought Richard Paul to campus for a presentation on the nature and
Nosich was at that time still in his Deductive Reconstruction phase present in his text Reasons and
Arguments (1982) He has since changed in an attempt to avoid the formal logic that deductive
reconstruction requires. For an explanation of the shift see his article “From Argument and
Philosophy to Critical Thinking Across the Curriculum.” INQUIRY: Critical Thinking Across the
Disciplines, 25(3), 4-13.
5
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value of CT. While Paul did a splendid job and his presentation was well attended,
again nothing changed in terms of instruction. Finally, in 1988, funded by two FIPSE
grants from the U.S. Department of Education ($68,500, $106,110), a group of
humanities faculty began planning the freshman critical thinking and written
composition sequence. From 1991 to 2005, various parts of the program were
sustained and enhanced by four generous grants from the Hall Family Foundation
($175,000, $175,000, $396,000, and $120,000).
I think it is fair to say that the Baker program was developed and sustained
under ideal conditions. Financial support from various grants, totaling over one
million dollars allowed those working on the project the luxury to do what few
groups charged with designing such programs have been able to do. First the faculty
members were given 25% (one course each semester) released time for two years.
Second, the grants allowed many of us to attend numerous International Critical
Thinking Conferences organized yearly by Richard Paul and his colleagues at
Sonoma State University. In making presentations describing our project, we gained
valuable feedback from the scores of people who attended the sessions. Third, as we
were working on the courses, we had funds to bring in some of the better known
and respected scholars in the area of CT. They came to campus and gave
presentations on their conceptions of CT and how to teach it. They also evaluated
our plans and materials for the freshman sequence, including drafts of the text we
were writing for the course. These scholars included Harvey Siegel (1988), Stephen
Norris (1989), Ralph Johnson (2000), Ed Damer (2001), Connie Missimer (1986),
and Jerry Cederblom (2006). Prior to Harvey Siegel’s visit, as a point of departure
for the project, the professors working on the courses read and discussed his fine
book, Educating Reason. I thought that we could make better progress on designing
the courses if we all could understand and endorse Harvey’s conception and defense
of CT as an educational ideal. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly for the goal of
CTAC, from 1992 to 2003, the grant money from the Hall Family Foundation allowed
my colleague Anne Spencer and I to put on summer workshops for any Baker faculty
who were going to teach a section of the required course for the first time, as well as
anyone who was interested in integrating the CT skills that were covered by all
freshmen into their courses in their disciplines. Again, given the redundancy
problem of teaching the same basic skills in every course, this seemed to be the best
approach to CTAC. The format of the workshops was to have the participants work
through our text, Reasoning and Writing: From Critical Thinking to Composition
(Hatcher and Spencer, 2006), and on the last day of the workshop do presentations
on how they would use the CT material in their classes. Finally, the grants funded
one-course released time each semester for its director. As a result, I ran weekly
staff meetings where the teachers would go over the material in the text that would
be taught that week. An instructors’ manual was also developed and distributed to
the teachers.
It is hard to imagine a healthier environment for producing a quality CT
program and for achieving the goal of CTAC. With the institutional support, plenty of
financial resources available, and the genuine desire by faculty to teach our students
to write solid, well-argued critical papers, if we could not be successful, how could
anyone expect to be?
10
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Given that some might think any failure was a function of our approach to CT,
a brief description of the freshman sequence might be helpful. The courses began,
not unlike other critical thinking courses, by defining6 and explaining the nature and
importance of critical thinking. For example, we show how many social problems,
such as those resulting from prejudice against women and minorities, result from
people basing beliefs on insufficient evidence. Most importantly, we argue that
college educations, at least those not focused on job training, typically ask students
to read material that express competing points of view. So, if one is not to become
cynical about discovering which position is more rational, one needs the tools
necessary for evaluating the arguments for the alternative positions.
After showing the importance of critical thinking, instruction in basic critical
thinking skills followed. The skills were the same ones emphasized at the beginning
of this paper: summarizing readings and arguments, evaluating arguments, and
using the knowledge of valid argument patterns to develop strong arguments for
papers. Again, our approach to argument evaluation was a combination of Deductive
Reconstruction, a approach employed by other textbook authors (Nosich, 1982;
Cederblom & Paulsen, 2006), and teaching informal fallacies. The appeal of
Deductive Reconstruction was largely a function of its simplicity (Hatcher, 2009);
i.e., if arguments are in a valid deductive form, then, for purposes of evaluation, the
main question is whether the premises are relevant and reasonable or do they need
further support. Evaluating the level of support for the premises usually involves
understanding the nature of evidence based on good inductive inferences.
We spent only three to four weeks studying deduction, induction, and a few
of the more common informal fallacies. The final weeks of the semester showed
students how to apply the logical tools of Deductive Reconstruction to writing solid
position papers on issues of their choice. Hence, we believed that the logical skills
that our students learned should easily transfer to any course where papers with a
thesis were required.
The second semester of the course asked students to apply these same
critical thinking skills and strategies to five sets of readings and write five additional
critical papers, all including the same basic parts (albeit not necessarily in the same
order): thesis, support, counter-arguments or objections, replies, and conclusion.
Students were required to follow the same process. Where in the first semester, all
sections used the same text, teachers were free to choose any set of readings, as long
as the papers followed the same process and were graded by the program’s agreed
upon grading rubric.
With a program with plenty of financial support, sound advice from a stellar
group of experts, and a willing cadre of teachers, how could the program not
succeed? If this “Gold Medal” program had unsatisfactory results, then it would
seem that a successful CTAC program would also be implausible. In fact, the pre to
Our definition of CT is “Thinking the attempts to arrive at a judgment only after honestly evaluating
alternatives with respect to available evidence and arguments” (Hatcher and Spencer, p.1.) This
definition was influenced by Connie Missimer’s work and our conviction that the process of CT
should end in an argumentative paper, where serious research precedes deciding on a position.
6
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post-test gains using the California Critical Thinking Skills Test and the Cornell Level
Z Critical Thinking Test (CLZ) were satisfactory, always above 0.50 of a standard
deviation. However, and here is the rub, when I looked at the range of student
scores on the CLZ relative to their first-semester CT instructor, the semester when
the logical skills covered by that test were supposed to be taught, the range turned
out to be great. While the mean gain for 369 students over the three years was +3.0
points with an effect size of +0.60, the mean gains relative to individual instructors
ranged from +6.0 to -1.0. Some instructors did a superb job; others seemed to make
students worse.
What this shows is something many already know, but has not been
demonstrated: Even with the best of intentions by the teachers and a program with
plenty of faculty development funds, some people are much better than others at
teaching the logical skills needed to do well on CT tests like the CLZ. Even with
significant outside funding for serious faculty development, the data indicate that
some teachers were unable to teach their students the CT skills needed to do well on
the CLZ.7
Most institutions that emphasize CT as a desirable educational outcome do
not have this sort of resources. If many of the faculty members in the Baker Program
could not teach CT, why assume that faulty without such training, support, and
enthusiasm can teach it?
5. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
5.1 Objection #1:
If one wants to see how to teach critical thinking across the curriculum, just look at
the scores of articles in INQUIRY: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines. There are
obviously lots of classes in many disciplines that are successful. Tom Solon (2003)
has shown how integrating CT skills into a course in general psychology can achieve
great pre to post-test gains.
First, as noted earlier, Solon’s study may only show that Tom Solon is a good
teacher and can effectively teach CT in a General Psychology class. The study, as far
as I know, has never been replicated. This interpretation is consistent with the
checkered pre and post test scores in the BU Program where students in some
sections had good effect size gains, while those with some teachers actually got
worse.
As an aside, the checkered results also mean that one should not quickly endorse a specific
approach to teaching CT based on published assessment data from one teacher teaching one section
of any CT course for only one semester. For example, prior to calculating the effect size gains relative
to Baker’s instructors, when Tom Solon (2003) reported effect size gains of 0.87 on the CLZ for an
experimental group of 25 students taking his Introduction to Psychology class that included
instruction in logic and CT skills, it appeared that his integrative approach was far superior to all
others (Hatcher, 2006). Now, given the wide range of Baker’s scores, such a conclusion may be
unwarranted. It may just be that Solon was an excellent teacher, while others may never be able to
replicate those splendid gains, even if they followed his approach and used the same materials.
7
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Second, Solon’s course integrating CT and psychology had students spending
significant time studying chapters four through seven of Diane Halpern’s text,
Thought and Knowledge. These are the chapters that cover deductive and inductive
logic, as well as probable reasoning. These are the sorts of things that are on most
standardized CT tests, especially the Cornell Level Z. This sort of commitment to the
study of logic is not typically found in courses across the disciplines.
Third, the courses described in the articles in INQUIRY tend, like Solon’s, to
be unique courses in a discipline rather than CTAC programs with multiple sections.
It is hard to know if any positive results can be replicated. My intuition is that much
has to do with the commitment, knowledge, and passion of the instructors.
5.2 Objection #2:
Nothing in this paper precludes having a philosophy department, rather than faculty
from a variety of humanities disciplines, teach a standard critical thinking course
that covers the three basic CT skills to all students and then have a few courses from
a variety of disciplines throughout the next three years specifically create
assignments that require students to apply the skills. This seems like a workable
approach.
Actually, this would be ideal. However, a required CT course taught by a
philosophy department is unlikely for many reasons. First, the resources that would
be required are not there unless the school hired numerous new philosophy
teachers. If only the existing staff is used, then every section of CT that is offered
means one fewer section of “real philosophy.” It is a “zero-sum game.” That may not
be what the department wants, especially in smaller departments with limited
courses offerings . Second, many professors of philosophy are simply not interested
in teaching a basic CT course. They are experts who want to teach courses in their
chosen field of study. If the uninterested are forced to teach a section of CT, nothing
good will come of that sort of situation. Finally, as Scriven has pointed out (1991, pp.
1-2), there will not be agreement on what is meant by CT and some departments
will simply want to call their traditional formal logic course “critical thinking.”
5.3 Objection #3:
Some, like Jerry Nosich (2010), might claim that my conclusion only follows because
I have given a narrow “philosophers’” conception of CT, which assumes that CT
skills must include knowledge of logic, either formal or informal.
In response, I agree that I am using a conception of CT that assumes some
knowledge of logic. But, how else can one decide among competing ideas except by
examining the level of support for each? That means looking at the relationship
between the premises and the conclusion of each alternative, and deciding whether
the premises themselves are relevant to the conclusion and reasonable. In other
words, one needs to determine the level of inductive support for the premises.
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6. CONCLUSION
So, what can we reasonably conclude? The reports of effect size gains on
standardized CT tests have been minimal. The skills that are essential for effective
CT (understanding arguments, evaluating arguments, and articulating one’s
judgment) are not skills that are emphasized across the disciplines. In fact, in my
own experience, they were never emphasized. And finally, there is at least some
evidence that faculty from across the disciplines are not very good at teaching these
CT skills, even when they are provided with plenty of support, instruction, and
encouragement. So, I conclude that CTAC is an implausible goal in higher education.
Having said that, given the importance of CT in higher education, what in an
ideal world might we do? Ideally, what is the most reasonable strategy? Here, I will
refer to the words of Kevin Possin (2013, p. 12) in his recent paper “A Fatal Flaw in
the Collegiate Learning Assessment Test“ (the CLA) :
Critical-thinking skills are not statistically significantly enhanced by content-specific
courses like introduction to philosophy or chemistry, or by content-independent
courses such as symbolic logic. So much, then, for leaving the task of magically
enhancing critical-thinking skills to “immersion” and “critical thinking across the
curriculum.”
To enhance critical-thinking skills, students should be deliberately and explicitly
studying critical thinking with the assistance of those with real expertise in those
skills. Simply having a graduate degree is poor evidence of having acquired that
expertise.

While Possin’s position is consistent with my own arguments with respect to
CT skills not being present across the curriculum and is supported by much of the
empirical research one finds in the literature (Ortiz, 2007; van Gelder, 2004), if we
follow Possin’s recommendation, it remains to be seen where the resources are to
hire only those “with real expertise in those skills” to teach all students. However, it
is not impossible. After all, schools find resources for all sorts of things they deem
important: sports programs, math requirements, foreign language requirements,
etc. Perhaps that 99% of faculty who claim that “developing students’ ability to think
critically is very important or essential (Arum & Roksa, 2011, p. 35.) should put
pressure on administrators to come up with the funds. Doesn’t willing an end entail
willing the means?
However, one CT course does not CTAC make. As I mentioned earlier, one
possible solution would be for colleges to designate a list of special courses as “CT
Courses.” In addition to the required course taught by “real experts,” colleges should
require students to take three or four additional courses that require the application
of the skills learned from the “real experts.” Some have already done this with their
“Writing Across the Curriculum Programs.” If students are given quality instruction
in those skills early in their college educations and are required to apply them in at
least a few courses through the rest of their educations, they should become better
critical thinkers. Lest one think this is too much to ask, we should remember that,
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according to Forbes, CT skills were ranked #1 by would-be employers for 2013
(Casserly, 2012).
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